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THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Joel P. Trachtman 
Observers of international law have criticized the Westphalian par-
adigm for nearly a century. The Westphalian paradigm has become less 
useful, both as a general way to order the world, and as a general way to 
understand the world. Functional adaptation has already begun to re-order 
the world inconsistently with the Westphalian paradigm. The European 
Union is only the most obvious example. But this reordering has been im-
peded by the continued use of the Westphalian paradigm to understand the 
world. Indeed, the exceptions to the Westphalian paradigm have been mul-
tiplying for the past 100 years, and the movement toward an international 
law of cooperation that Wolfgang Friedmann documented in 1964 in The 
Changing Structure of International Law has accelerated and intensified the 
exceptions to the Westphalian paradigm so much that it no longer satisfies 
the test of Occam’s Razor. This is the central crisis in international law. A 
simpler paradigm, one admitting far fewer exceptions, is the functionalist 
paradigm, which accepts that the state is contingent, and that international 
law tends to constrain, indeed, to mold, the state based on functional effi-
ciency. This essay elaborates a functionalist paradigm that understands the 
sovereignty of states in utilitarian, and contingent, terms. 
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I. WHAT CRISIS?  
Perhaps we use the term “crisis” too readily, in a kind of collective 
anxiety that disaster is just around the corner. It is true that disaster—in the 
form of war, disease, environmental degradation, financial catastrophe, and 
trade war—is always just around the corner. But that is a constant condition. 
So what is the crisis today?  
  
  Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
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An appropriate definition of “crisis” is that it is “a stage in a se-
quence of events at which the trend of all future events, especially for better 
or for worse, is determined.”1 In this sense, a crisis is a juncture between 
paths—one for better, one for worse. But the choice of paths at this moment 
is not just at the level of policy choice on issues such as war, disease, and 
the environment. Rather, it is a choice of paths about the role of internation-
al law in our lives. We can choose to continue to use a Westphalian para-
digm that assumes that the state is the exclusive source of authority, that 
assumes and institutionalizes a weak form of international law, and that fails 
to provide tools to address our most pressing international problems, or we 
can choose a more scientific and open-minded functionalist paradigm.  
We are in the midst of a Kuhnian scientific revolution in interna-
tional law, in which the existing paradigm has grown increasingly unable to 
explain what we do, or to give us the tools to devise solutions to our prob-
lems.2 A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists 
encounter too many anomalies that cannot be explained by the accepted 
paradigm.3 The number of anomalies to the Westphalian paradigm has mul-
tiplied in the past century, and the existing paradigm has too many excep-
tions. There is a new paradigm which can accommodate all the existing 
exceptions and that can provide a framework for analysis that allows us to 
see where additional international law and organization would be useful, 
and also where it would not. This new paradigm, described below, might be 
labeled “social science functionalism.” In this sense, our crisis is an intellec-
tual or theoretical crisis, but it has important real world effects. The para-
digm, according to Kuhn, is not just a theory, but the entire worldview that 
it entails.  
In this brief exposition,4 I describe the existing paradigm, explain 
what I see as the growing pressure on this paradigm and the multiplication 
of exceptions, propose a social science functionalist paradigm, and explain 
the worldview implications of functionalism.  
  
 1 Crisis Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/crisis (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2012); see also NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 410 (3d ed. 2010). 
 2 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (3d ed. 1996). 
When a present paradigm is no longer able to give us the answers we seek, “[t]he decision to 
reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another.” Id. 
 3 Id. at 6. 
 4 I expand on this exposition in my forthcoming book, JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNMENT (forthcoming 2012). 
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II. THE WESTPHALIAN PARADIGM AND THE MULTIPLICATION OF 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Westphalian paradigm is still the dominant paradigm in inter-
national law. It posits that international law is weak, and that the state is 
strong. Under the Westphalian paradigm, state sovereignty is the dominant 
concept, and it excludes the possibility of international legal authority.5 Ra-
ther, under the Westphalian paradigm, international law is a weak force that 
can play only an interstitial role.6  
One of the corollaries of the Westphalian paradigm is the consent-
based system of international lawmaking.7 Unlike in national government 
systems, there is no possibility to bind holdouts. The inability to bind hold-
outs makes it more difficult to reach agreement to provide international pub-
lic goods, and to address international externalities, especially under cir-
cumstances of asymmetry. By asymmetry, I mean circumstances in which 
the overall value of an international legal rule is significantly greater for one 
state proposed to be party than for another. For example, while many states 
will be hurt by global warming, there are some states that would not be 
harmed, or would benefit. Without the possibility to bind holdouts, presum-
ably accepted by each state in a kind of “constitutional moment” in ex-
change for other states agreeing to do likewise, it is difficult to create effec-
tive international legal rules and organizations. Examples of areas in which 
these rules and organizations may be required include international envi-
ronmental protection, international public health, trade and international 
financial regulation.  
A second corollary of the Westphalian paradigm, related to the first, 
is weak enforcement of international law.8 In fact, we might characterize 
this corollary as a requirement of subsequent consent to actually have a 
state’s conduct controlled by a legal rule that attained initial consent—that 
entered into force—at an earlier time. The broader rule that includes both 
corollaries is one of continuous state autonomy—both at the time of entry 
into international law and at the time of its application or enforcement.9 The 
  
 5 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999) 
(“[Sovereignty] is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors 
from domestic authority structures.”). 
 6 Id. 
 7 E.g., Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of 
Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 
443–44 (2010). 
 8 See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 28–39 (2009) (arguing that the 
lack of institutional structure in international law causes the weakness in international law). 
 9 See KRASNER, supra note 5, at 20 (explaining that within states “domestic political 
authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior”). 
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result of this second corollary is to make international law an unreliable 
system, unable to address real international cooperation problems because 
states are unable to commit to obligations. In fact, a growing stream of in-
ternational legal scholarship, recently evidenced by work of Curt Bradley 
and Mitu Gulati,10 seeks to accentuate the Westphalian paradigm by arguing 
for the need for continuing consent to the binding effect of international 
law. Other scholars, such as Eric Posner, simply argue that international law 
is incapable of having the power to cause compliance.11 Note that this corol-
lary actually denies states an important power: the power to bind themselves 
contractually to cooperate with other states. By doing so, it artificially im-
pedes desirable cooperation.  
So, the Westphalian paradigm, under both of its corollaries, im-
pedes or prevents cooperation by states to address international cooperation 
problems. This was not as serious a problem when fewer international co-
operation problems existed, but as we move from the “law of coexistence” 
to the “law of cooperation,” this problem has grown more serious. Just a 
century ago, none of the major new categories of international law—
addressing trade, investment, finance, monetary policy, environment, health, 
human rights, and cybersecurity—were very significant. There were good 
reasons—functional reasons—why they were not. There simply were few 
international concerns raised by these types of issues.  
As Wolfgang Friedmann explained in his classic 1964 work, The 
Changing Structure of International Law, “the principal preoccupation of 
the classical international law, as formulated by Grotius and the other 
founders, was the formalization, and the establishment of generally accepta-
ble rules of conduct in international diplomacy.”12 This was the internation-
al law of coexistence, and it also included the regulation of war, which de-
veloped into the main concern.13 These were rules about the method by 
which states would interact, and about their use of force, and while states 
  
 10 See Curtis A. Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 
YALE L.J. 202, 275 (2010) (arguing against a restriction on opt-out rights under customary 
international law which would eliminate the need for consent). 
 11 Compare  POSNER, supra note 8, at x, with Joel P. Trachtman, Book Review: The Perils 
of Global Legalism, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1263 (2009).  
 12 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1964); 
accord 22 DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, CONSENT AND COMMITMENT IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: 
THE CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS (1997). Johnston sug-
gests that the period until World War I was a period of “classical” international law, focusing 
on constraining the use of force, communication, and settlement of disputes. The subsequent 
“neo-classical” period until the mid-1960’s extended this project to intergovernmental organ-
ization, codification, and human rights. For Johnston, the current “post-classical” period is 
concerned with the establishment of cooperative regimes and the transformation of interna-
tional society to a world community.  
 13 FRIEDMANN, supra note 12, at 5. 
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interacted in various ways, they did not contract significantly over other 
matters. But as Friedmann explained, the changing demands of international 
society produced demand for additional types of international law.14 
Two major types of change have made the role of the international 
law of cooperation more important. First, with industrialization, including 
technological change, urbanization, and the development of modern econo-
mies, the state has found it useful to intervene domestically in a variety of 
regulatory contexts.15 This is the rise of the regulatory or interventionist 
state. Second, with globalization, these interventions and the circumstances 
to which they respond often cross borders or affect the conditions of cross-
border competition.16 Furthermore, globalization has included greater indus-
trialization of developing countries, increasingly involving poor countries in 
these concerns.  
Above, I mention the growing argument that the enforcement of in-
ternational law should be conditioned on contemporaneous consent. This 
should be understood as an attack on the distinguishing characteristic of 
international law: its ability to bind states to take action that they otherwise 
would not consent to take. The attack by international legal scholarship on 
international law has had a second dimension, proposing that so-called “soft 
law” can achieve most of the goals of international law in a superior man-
ner.17 The move toward soft law is best understood as an attempt to address 
current international problems, while acquiescing in the Westphalian para-
digm.  
Of course, as Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer have explained, 
there is no reason to believe that soft law could not be a satisfactory, indeed 
an optimal, method of cooperation in particular cases.18 This is clear in theo-
ry, and the fact that states make soft law suggests that it serves some coop-
eration purposes. Some scholars have recently argued that in particular con-
texts, such as international finance19 or carbon reduction,20 soft law is supe-
rior to hard law.  
  
 14 Id. at 152. 
 15 Steven Wheatley, A Democratic Rule of International Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 525, 
528–29 (2011). 
 16 See id. 
 17 Andrew Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 
222 (2010).  
 18 See id. at 176–78 (explaining the benefits of soft law). 
 19 See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—and Not Trade, 
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 628–29 (2010). 
 20 See Alexander Thompson, Efficiency, Distribution and the Soft Law Future of the Cli-
mate Regime (Apr. 8–9, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (prepared for presentation at the 
International Policymaking and Agreements Conference, Yale University), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/IEPA-papers/Thompson_Climate_Yale.pdf (discussing 
soft law as an appropriate regime given the nature of the problem of climate change).  
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However, it is also true that soft law would not be a satisfactory 
method of cooperation in all cases. This is also clear in theory: the fact that 
states make hard international law suggests that it is superior to soft law in 
some cases. The binding nature of hard law, the default rules that it entails, 
the possible linkage to other hard law rules, and other features of hard law, 
would be expected to be valuable in particular cases.21 As Guzman and 
Meyer point out, where the only goal is coordination, soft law may serve 
well.22 However, where a state may gain by its violation, as in cases of ex-
ternalities or public goods, cooperation—as opposed to coordination—is 
needed.23 
The Westphalian paradigm thus renders international law unsuitable 
to address important international problems. The fact that states seek to ad-
dress these problems can be seen as the major exception, and the major 
source of pressure, on the Westphalian paradigm.24 The move from the in-
ternational law of coexistence to the international law of cooperation has 
resulted in greater need for cooperation.25 At the same time, it has resulted 
in greater asymmetry and greater asset specificity.26 Asset specificity occurs 
where cooperation might require states to make substantial investments in 
cooperation prior to their opportunity to ascertain whether other states will 
hold up their end of the bargain. 
Asymmetry causes holdouts where there are differences in national 
goals, levels of wealth, or pre-existing national structures, making it less 
desirable for some states to cooperate than others.27 The problem of hold-
outs can be addressed either by structuring compensating payments or pack-
age deals, or by establishing rules of non-unanimous decision-making.28  
At the time of enforcement, asymmetry and asset specificity result 
in strong incentives for states not to comply, given that they have different 
  
 21 See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 17, at 175–76 (2010) (giving examples why a state 
may prefer hard law to soft law).  
 22 See id. at 190 (“[T]hese coordination problems can be solved in a variety of ways, and 
soft law instruments are among them.”).  
 23 See id. at 198–99.  
 24 See Georges Abi-Saab, General Conclusions, in 1 STANDARD-SETTING IN UNESCO:  
NORMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 395, 396–97 (Abdulqawi A. 
Yusuf ed., 2007) (describing the Westphalian system and how it is unsuitable to resolve 
problems of international law).  
 25 See id. at 397 (discussing the transition from the international law of coexistence to the 
international law of cooperation). 
 26 See id. at 397–98 (explaining cooperation based on an individual nation’s capacity).  
 27 See id. (describing a “division of labor” between participating nations when cooperating 
towards a common goal).  
 28 See Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International 
Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 964 (2000) (“Some international laws reflect the distribution of 
power in which powerful nations gain and weak nations lose.”).  
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interests or that the other state or states have already made their contribution 
and the states that have not can obtain these benefits without contributing 
themselves.  
III. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE FUNCTIONALIST PARADIGM 
I argue below that an appropriate evolution of the functionalist and 
neo-functionalist approaches to international integration—to the develop-
ment of international government—would approach integration from the 
standpoint of the new institutional economics.  “New institutional econom-
ics”29 addresses the reasons for formation of institutions, and for particular 
institutional structures.  The methods of new institutional economics include 
price theory, transaction costs economics, and game theory.  While func-
tionalism, and its neo-functionalist enhancement, has evolved to be compat-
ible in most dimensions with the new institutional economics, this compati-
bility has not been generally accepted.30  By making the compatibility ex-
plicit, I am able to link functionalism to modern social scientific ideas about 
why people, and states, form institutions, including international law and 
international organizations.   
As an intellectual doctrine, social science functionalism began with 
David Mitrany’s 1933 work, The Progress of International Government.31 
Mitrany posited that if international administrative capacity were developed 
in order to address specific technical problems, there would be a “spillover” 
effect pursuant to which increasing functions would be assigned to interna-
tional administration, and eventually individuals would transfer their loyalty 
to these organizations.32 While in the broadest sweep of history, it is possi-
ble that this type of process might occur, there are two core problems with 
Mitrany’s doctrine. First, he did not specify a plausible causal mechanism 
for spillover. We might suggest that synergies in the form of economies of 
scale or economies of scope would be one plausible causal mechanism. 
  
 29 See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM (1985); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. 
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio ed., 1992); Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the 
Theory of the International Economic Organization:  Toward Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470 (1997). 
 30 But see Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International Gov-
ernance, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (re-
ferring to the new institutional economics literature). 
 31 See DAVID MITRANY, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1933) (discuss-
ing international government, state equity, communal organization of world affairs, and 
states’ authority).  
 32 See id. at 61–62 (discussing small states placing their faith in an international organiza-
tion).  
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Once we specify this type of causal mechanism, we see the second problem: 
economies of scale and scope would only apply in specific contexts—not in 
all contexts. Therefore, there will remain an important role for the state. 
Furthermore, there is no need for a transfer of loyalty. Loyalty is a complex 
emotional and rational sense, and a rational transfer of authority might pre-
cede by many generations a transfer of loyalty.33 Friedmann was influenced 
by Mitrany.34 As Charles Leben writes, for Friedmann: 
[S]tates were, whether they liked it or not, drawn into a cooperation 
movement because in both economic and technical terms they had become 
objectively interdependent. Governments needed to ensure this coopera-
tion not only by concluding bilateral or multilateral treaties in ever-
growing numbers, but especially by creating international organizations to 
carry out the functions essential to the welfare of states. Friedmann was 
undoubtedly influenced here by the so-called functionalist doctrine . . . .
35
 
One may understand this essay as an extension of the functionalist 
project. However, it should not be understood as advocacy for integration, 
or, like functionalism, as assuming a telos of integration, but rather as an 
attempt to develop a methodology for the analysis of integration that in-
cludes the possibility of both integration and disintegration. While there is 
no telos of integration, it is possible to examine changing social, technologi-
cal, military, environmental, and economic trends and to anticipate resulting 
institutional needs. There will also be circumstances in which changing cir-
cumstances make disintegration appropriate. 
Functionalism and neofunctionalism were speculative and idealis-
tic.36 They suggested that the formation of secretariats would have unin-
tended spillover effects, providing a “supply” of integrative machinery that 
would stimulate demand.37 These spillover effects were never fully theo-
rized, nor empirically validated, and the teleology of integration posited by 
the neo-functionalists could not survive observations of reversals of integra-
tion.38  
  
 33 See JOHN S. GIBSON, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (1991) (discussing organizations that have goals of shared security and 
well-being instead of their nation’s goals and policies).  
 34 Charles Leben, The Changing Structure of International Law Revisited by Way of Intro-
duction, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 401 (1997) (explaining that David Mitrany influenced Fried-
mann in Friedmann’s 1943 work The Changing Structure). 
 35 Id.  
 36 See GIBSON, supra note 33, at 107 (stating that functionalism “encompasses much ideal-
ism, or what ought to take place in international integration”).  
 37 See id. at 75 (discussing spillover effects and a shift from stabilization to economic 
equalization).  
 38 See id. 
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Mitrany himself rejected social scientific approaches, relying in-
stead on “judgment.”39 This may be understood as dissatisfaction with the 
then-current state of social science. Regardless, modern analytical sensibili-
ties would find “judgment” inadequate where social scientific theory and 
methods possess greater analytical leverage. One of the social scientific 
heirs to functionalism is the field of study known as “constitutional econom-
ics,” which examines the social scientific causes and effects of constitution-
al rules.40  
The functionalism and neofunctionalism of David Mitrany and 
Ernst Haas41 was famously discredited because it appeared to claim too 
much, with inadequate social scientific foundations, and an inability to 
overcome empirical challenges.42 And yet, the functionalist idea can be ac-
commodated comfortably within established social science, including espe-
cially, but by no means limited to, the new institutional economics. A social 
scientific perspective on functionalism asks simply what are the costs and 
benefits of legal rules and institutions.43 This normative social science func-
tionalist theory is agnostic regarding the types of rules or institutions that 
will be selected, but theorizes that rules and institutions serve the function 
of allowing cooperation that provides benefits greater than its costs.44 A 
positive social science functionalist theory would seek to link certain causes 
  
 39 See, e.g., David Mitrany, A Political Theory for the New Society, in FUNCTIONALISM: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 25, 26 (A.J.R. Groom & Paul Taylor 
eds., 1975) (describing the social scientists’ efforts as having “no unity of scope or method of 
comprehension, not even of language”). 
 40 See Joel P. Trachtman, Constitutional Economics of the WTO, in RULING THE WORLD: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & 
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
 41 See Ernst B. Haas, The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joys and An-
guish of Pretheorizing, 24 INT’L ORG. 607 (1970) [hereinafter Haas, Joys and Anguish], and 
Ernst B. Haas, Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration, 30 INT’L ORG. 173 
(1976) [hereinafter Haas, Turbulent Fields], for a representative sample of Haas’s use of 
functionalist and neo-functionalist principles. 
 42 See, e.g., Haas, Turbulent Fields, supra note 41, at 173 (“Theories of regional integra-
tion are becoming obsolescent because three core assumptions on which these theories have 
been based are becoming less and less relevant to the behavior patterns actually displayed by 
governments active in regional organizations.”); Mark F. Imber, Re-Reading Mitrany: A 
Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty, 10 REV. INT’L STUD. 103, 105 (1984) (“Functionalism 
does not satisfy Rapoport's most exacting requirement that a theory . . . is a collection of 
derived theorems tested in the process of predicting events from observed conditions.’”) 
(emphasis added). 
 43 See, e.g., Imber, supra note 42, at 107 (“In these circumstances, Mitrany’s argument 
appeals to cost-benefit comparison.”).  
 44 See David Mitrany, The Functional Approach to World Organization, 24 INT'L AFF. 
350, 356 (1948) (“[T]he functional approach emphasizes the common index of need. There 
are many such needs which cut across national boundaries, and an effective beginning could 
be made by providing joint government for them.”). 
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to the establishment of rules or institutions, in order to predict the circum-
stances under which particular rules or institutions might arise.45 
Functionalism can be rehabilitated and operationalized by redefin-
ing its roots in the new institutional economics, which includes constitution-
al economics. By showing the logic of integration, and of disintegration, in 
terms of the analytical techniques of the new institutional economics, in-
cluding transaction costs economizing, game theory, and other social scien-
tific techniques, it is possible to explain why we would observe integration, 
stasis, or disintegration under specific circumstances. The basic methodolo-
gy bringing these techniques together is comparative institutional cost-
benefit analysis.46 The first step will necessarily be a ground-up analysis of 
specific cooperation problems. Second, we must evaluate alternative institu-
tional solutions to each of these cooperation problems. Third, we must eval-
uate the possibility of horizontal overlaps and institutional synergies that 
make it useful to establish institutions that are linked with one another or 
that perform multiple functions. This, in short, is the appropriate methodol-
ogy of functionalism.  
Mitrany’s model began with national preferences: the need to coop-
erate with other states in order to achieve those preferences efficiently. This 
approach is consistent with a social scientific approach.47 
Mitrany’s second step was to posit that international organizations 
would be formed in response to these needs.48 This second step skipped 
over the possibility of the establishment of international law without a spe-
cific organization.49 We might say that such establishment of international 
law relies on the default international legal system as its “organization.”50  
Third, Mitrany posited that once an international organization is es-
tablished, bureaucratic imperatives would result in an expanded set of pow-
ers for the international organization.51 This third step seems least plausible, 
  
 45 See Imber, supra note 42, at 108 (“The second stage of Mitrany’s argument is to estab-
lish specific conditions in which appropriate international organizations may be founded.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 46 See id. at 107 (“In these circumstances, Mitrany’s argument appeals to cost-benefit 
comparison.”).  
 47 See id. at 105 (“[D]omestic governments recognize that the specific responsibilities that 
they currently discharge or may in future be called upon to meet will be more effectively 
performed through international co-operation.”). 
 48 See id. (“[A]n international organization relevant to [a responsibility the domestic gov-
ernment cannot effectively perform] must be established, and a grant of powers and re-
sources made to it.”). 
 49 See id. at 108. 
 50 The lack of “prior commitment to co-operation in other fields” implies a reliance on the 
default system and provisions of international law. Id. 
 51 Imber, supra note 42, at 109 (“Some authors have characterized this dynamic element in 
the development of the international organization’s responsibilities as ‘task-expansion.’ This 
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as it assumes a kind of error, or failure to anticipate, on the part of the con-
stitutive states. An alternative explanation involves a revelatory role for 
international organizations, discovering further opportunities for beneficial 
cooperation that would not be discovered otherwise. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible that established international legal rules or organizations would have 
excess capacity, and so economies of scale or scope might induce the allo-
cation of additional responsibility to these rules or organizations.52 Finally, 
the growth of international legal rules makes it easier to enforce other inter-
national legal rules, so a kind of network externality might also allow ex-
pansion in one area to induce expansion in other areas. Mitrany also thought 
in terms of a single “seat of authority,” with transfer of authority over time 
after national sovereignty died a death of a thousand cuts.53 Mitrany put it as 
follows:  
By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command 
over requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from 
the old authority to the new, and the accumulation of such partial transfers 
in time brings about a translation of the seat of authority.
54
 
This approach seems historically incorrect and inconsistent with a 
federalist approach that would accept multiple loci of authority, or constitu-
tional pluralism.55 It also seems inconsistent with a social scientific or sub-
sidiarity-based approach, which would accept that different types of prob-
lems are best addressed at varying levels of authority. Finally, it seems to 
assume that delegations of authority to international organizations would be 
systematically overbroad.56  
Most speculatively, and idealistically, “Mitrany argued that the suc-
cessful growth of functional international organizations, fulfilling many of 
the welfare responsibilities previously reserved to the state, would create 
  
refers to the identification of a trend towards the transfer of increasingly significant powers 
to the international organization concerned vis-à-vis the residual rights of the member 
states.”) (citation omitted).  
 52 See, e.g., Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A 
Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC, 20 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 1, 
4 (1991) (“The establishment of supranational institutions designed to deal with functionally 
specific tasks will set in motion economic, social and political processes which generate 
pressures towards further integration.”) (emphasis added). 
 53 DAVID MITRANY, THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS 128 (1975). 
 54 Id.  
 55 See Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 317 
(2002) (“Constitutional pluralism recognizes that in the post-Westphalian world there exists 
a range of different constitutional sites and processes . . . .”).  
 56 See MITRANY, supra note 53, at 128 (“To such willing transfers of sovereignty––or 
abridgement of national sovereignty––there is no limit except that set by our political maturi-
ty.”) (emphasis added).   
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positive incentives for states to maintain the peace.”57 What is the mecha-
nism by which functionalism causes peace? 
Mitrany's argument that the successful functional organization of 
services will reduce the use of force between participants is based upon an 
appreciation of enlightened self-interest.58 If state authorities increasingly 
rely on the technical and welfare services of international functional organi-
zations in order to satisfy the aspirations of their citizens, then each gov-
ernment will become vulnerable to the dislocation of those services, insofar 
as it wishes to fulfill domestic political objectives.59 So Mitrany’s argument 
regarding peace is also based on a social scientific, cost-benefit analysis 
perspective: functional integration increases the costs of war in terms of lost 
opportunities for cooperation.60 
Is this argument borne out empirically? In the evolution of ever-
broader social units, we see examples of a seeming decline of armed con-
flict between internal constituent units. If we observe the growth of the 
U.S., or of the E.U., we might see in their suppression of internal warfare 
evidence for Mitrany’s proposition. Yet there are possible counterexamples 
in the violent break-up of federal states such as Yugoslavia, and in the do-
mestic ethnic violence of Rwanda, the Congo, or Somalia. On the other 
hand, a refined study might show how these examples fit into a broader, 
more nuanced model. But that refined study is not available yet.  
Friedmann observed in 1964 that “[t]he economic senselessness of 
major wars, now demonstrated beyond doubt, has, however, been joined by 
the increasing realisation of the physical futility of war as a means of attain-
ing national objectives altogether.”61 While war has by no means been elim-
inated, international society has passed beyond a Hobbesian world of un-
constrained coercion and theft. States may no longer increase their territory 
by conquest. It is broadly understood to be not only illegal, but also illegiti-
mate, to engage in war to transfer wealth.62 No society has yet eliminated 
violence, and it is too idealistic to imagine that international society will do 
so. The important question is the incentives, and disincentives (including 
  
 57 Imber, supra note 42, at 106. 
 58 Id. (“Mitrany believed that the provision of improved welfare and economic opportuni-
ties through international co-operation would create strong ties between states, based on 
enlightened self-interest.”). 
 59 Id. at 111. 
 60 Id. at 107 (“[I]f equal or greater benefits may be obtained without use of force it is 
preferable to co-operate than to confront, and so avoid an unnecessary expenditure of re-
sources.”). 
 61 FRIEDMANN, supra note 12, at 13. 
 62 Joseph C. Sweeney, The Just War Ethic in International Law, 27 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 
1865, 1867–68 (2003) (discussing the situations under the U.N. Charter where nations are 
justified in utilizing military force). 
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legal disincentives), for violence. It is possible that as a result of other de-
velopments, states will determine to establish more compelling systems of 
multilateral response to aggression.  
Mitrany explained that the function would determine its appropriate 
organs.63 The recognition that different functions require different organiza-
tional responses indicates that no one type of international organization 
would be appropriate in response to multiple cooperation problems.  
Mitrany’s functionalism is based on the idea that “activities would 
be selected specifically and organized separately—each according to its 
nature . . . .”64 Thus, Mitrany’s approach envisioned and validated what we 
call today “fragmentation.”65 While this approach did not fully evaluate the 
possibility of functional overlaps—overlaps between different activities—
and economies of scope that might arise from combining functions within a 
single institution, Mitrany anticipated that some functions would intersect.66 
Coordination among functions would, according to Mitrany, come about 
functionally.67  
Mitrany, Haas, and other functionalists may have been ahead of 
their time, or may have relied too heavily on underspecified causal mecha-
nisms, or both. Social science functionalism is based on welfarism; assum-
ing that citizens, generally operating through states or perhaps regional or-
ganizations, would determine to utilize international legal cooperation in 
order to improve their welfare. There are, of course, other mechanisms. A 
public choice theorist would focus on political welfare instead of actual 
welfare.68 A constructivist would examine the ways in which individuals, as 
citizens or as government officials, establish their beliefs and identities.69 A 
behavioralist would similarly examine how individuals might develop loyal-
ties separately from their welfare interests. I have no reason to exclude these 
mechanisms, and I have not performed the empirical research that would be 
necessary to show that the welfarist mechanism has greater explanatory 
power than these other mechanisms. But in many other circumstances, wel-
fare has great explanatory power, and so it presents a useful theory, from 
  
 63 DAVID MITRANY, A WORK PEACE SYSTEM 72 (1966). 
 64 See id. at 70.  
 65 Id. at 72. 
 66 MITRANY, supra note 53, at 74. 
 67 Id. at 74–75 (“The co-ordination of such working functional agencies with an interna-
tional planning agencies would . . . bring[] out some interesting possibilities, should the ideas 
. . . come to fruition.”). 
 68 See William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS 2008, available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (last 
visited Oct. 3 2011) (describing public choice theory). 
 69 See Stephen M. Walt, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, FOREIGN 
POLICY, Spring 1998, at 29, 40–41 (discussing constructivist theory). 
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which testable hypotheses might be derived, and, more speculatively, from 
which policy may be made under uncertainty. 
IV. CONCLUSION: WORLDVIEW IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
FUNCTIONALISM 
Observers of international law have criticized the Westphalian par-
adigm for nearly a century. Over the long sweep of history, these criticisms 
have become more forceful. The Westphalian paradigm has become less 
useful, both as a general way to order the world, and as a general way to 
understand the world. Functional adaptation has already begun to reorder 
the world differently from the Westphalian paradigm. The E.U. is only the 
most obvious example. But this reordering has been impeded by the contin-
ued use of the Westphalian paradigm to understand the world. One of the 
goals of this book is to suggest a functionalist paradigm that understands the 
sovereignty of states in utilitarian, and contingent, terms.  
Indeed, the exceptions to the Westphalian paradigm have been mul-
tiplying for the past one hundred years, and the movement toward an inter-
national law of cooperation that Friedmann documented in 1964 has accel-
erated and intensified the exceptions to the Westphalian paradigm so much 
that the need for a new paradigm is apparent.70 This is the central crisis in 
international law. A simpler paradigm—one admitting far fewer excep-
tions—is the functionalist paradigm. This paradigm accepts that the state is 
contingent, and that international law tends to constrain, indeed, to mold, 
the state based on functional efficiency.  
The state’s continuing importance is validated by three forces: (1) 
its continuing ability to respond to many cooperation problems, (2) path 
dependence, which makes it difficult to move to other systems for ordering 
given the existing Westphalian paradigm, and (3) network externalities, 
which similarly support isomorphism among states. Of course, the first is 
the most powerful force, but it has been growing weaker. Path dependence 
and network externalities are subsidiary forces. The slow erosion in the util-
ity of the state to respond to certain types of cooperation problems can be 
expected to reach a point where it entirely demeans the force of path de-
pendence and network externalities. This point will be something like a 
“tipping point,” where the availability of multiple institutional structures 
will deprive path dependence and network externalities of most of their 
power. At that tipping point, the Westphalian paradigm will cease to have 
significant power and will be replaced by the functionalist paradigm.  
The worldview implications of a paradigm shift are important. Un-
der social science functionalism, we would accept that international law is 
  
 70 See generally FRIEDMANN, supra note 12, ch. 6 (addressing the changing structure of 
international law). 
File: Trachtman 2 Created on: 3/21/2012 8:53:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 4:00:00 PM 
2011] THE CRISIS 421 
important in order to address pressing international problems characterized 
by externalities or global public goods. We would accept that the scope of 
international law will be determined by what is necessary to address these 
problems, that it may be great, and that its scope is not limited by sovereign-
ty. We would understand that international law may have varying levels of 
power—that power is a design feature that depends on the particular coop-
eration problem being addressed. Under some circumstances—of high asset 
specificity—in order to be effective international law will require great 
power. These circumstances may include topics like global warming, mone-
tary policy, or the use of force. Before we develop effective law against use 
of force, greater integration may reduce incentives and capability to use 
force. This was the original functionalist idea of the 1952 European Coal 
and Steel Community, and of the subsequent European Economic Commu-
nity. 
